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Abstract
The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a differential brain response to violations of learned regularities. It has been used to
demonstrate that the brain learns the statistical structure of its environment and predicts future sensory inputs. However,
the algorithmic nature of these computations and the underlying neurobiological implementation remain controversial.
This article introduces a mathematical framework with which competing ideas about the computational quantities indexed
by MMN responses can be formalized and tested against single-trial EEG data. This framework was applied to five major
theories of the MMN, comparing their ability to explain trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude. Three of these theories
(predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty detection) were formalized by linking the MMN to different
manifestations of the same computational mechanism: approximate Bayesian inference according to the free-energy
principle. We thereby propose a unifying view on three distinct theories of the MMN. The relative plausibility of each theory
was assessed against empirical single-trial MMN amplitudes acquired from eight healthy volunteers in a roving oddball
experiment. Models based on the free-energy principle provided more plausible explanations of trial-by-trial changes in
MMN amplitude than models representing the two more traditional theories (change detection and adaptation). Our results
suggest that the MMN reflects approximate Bayesian learning of sensory regularities, and that the MMN-generating process
adjusts a probabilistic model of the environment according to prediction errors.
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Introduction
A key theme of contemporary neuroscience is the notion that
the brain embodies a generative model of the environment,
enabling inference on the causes of sensory inputs and predicting
future events. This is also known as the ‘‘Bayesian brain
hypothesis’’ (for reviews, see [1] and [2]). This framework provides
an abstract explanation of adaptive cognition and behaviour,
which has been instantiated in schemes like predictive coding and
hierarchical Bayesian message passing [3–5], or, more recently,
the free-energy principle [2].
Experimentally, an important paradigm for testing the
implications of these theories in humans is the mismatch
negativity (MMN) paradigm [6]. In this paradigm, electrophys-
iological methods such as electroencephalography (EEG) or
magnetoencephalography (MEG) are used to measure event-
related ‘‘mismatch potentials’’ in response to violations of
expectancy or learned regularities. Traditionally, the MMN (cf.
Figure 1) is recorded during auditory oddball experiments or,
more recently, during ‘‘roving’’ oddball paradigms. It can be
defined operationally by subtracting the event-related potential
(ERP) elicited by standards, i.e. stimuli that are predicted by an
established regularity, from the ERP elicited by deviants, i.e. the
same stimuli when they violate the regularity. The MMN is
usually expressed most strongly at fronto-central electrodes, and
its peak latency varies between 100 and 250 milliseconds after
deviance onset, depending on the specific paradigm and type of
regularity that is violated [7,8]. Previous EEG and fMRI studies
suggest that the MMN originates from temporal generators (A1
and STG) and a prefrontal generator in the inferior frontal gyrus
[9,10].
A major research theme has been the search for models of
the neurophysiological and computational processes that
underlie the MMN [7,11,12]. Such models would contribute
to a better understanding of statistical learning in the brain and
the prediction of future events. However, the neurocomputa-
tional processes that generate the mismatch negativity are still
subject to debate [7,13–15]. Over the years, five major
hypotheses have been formulated, which we compare in this
article:
1. Change Detection Hypothesis: The MMN reflects the detection of a
local physical change in the sensory input [16,17].
2. Adaptation Hypothesis: The MMN reflects the difference in
stimulus-evoked activity between adapted and non-adapted
sensory neurons [13,18].
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3. Model Adjustment Hypothesis: The auditory cortex maintains a
model of the acoustic environment, and stimulus-induced
updates of this model are indexed by the MMN [19,20].
4. Novelty Detection Hypothesis: The MMN reflects the degree to
which the current event is surprising (novel) [21,22]. An event
is surprising, if its occurrence violates a (probabilistic)
prediction. Surprise is different from change: when a change
occurs predictably in a given context, its absence will be more
surprising than its presence. Surprise is an undirected quantity;
this distinguishes it from prediction error (see below).
5. Prediction Error Hypothesis: The cortex implements approximate
Bayesian inference using predictive coding. The MMN reflects
the neural activity encoding the prediction errors that drive this
process; i.e., differences between actual and predicted inputs
[3,7]. In contrast to surprise, a prediction error indicates the
direction in which the event deviated from the brain’s
prediction.
So far there has been no objective procedure to conclude which
MMN theory is best supported by a given dataset, because most
theories of the MMN are of a qualitative nature and do not make
quantitative predictions. Furthermore, the inferences that could be
drawn were limited by the averaging inherent to standard ERP
analysis: this destroys any information about the temporal
dynamics of learning. The first goal of this study was to overcome
both limitations by providing a modelling framework with which
competing MMN theories can be formalized and objectively
compared against one another by their capacity to explain single-
trial MMN amplitudes. Here, the explanandum was not just the
mismatch negativity per se, but also how its single-trial amplitude
changes as the subject learns statistical regularities during the
successive presentation of stimuli. The mismatch response to the
same stimulus differs depending on the history of all preceding
stimuli, and our models should be able to predict these changes.
Figure 1. Data acquisition: EEG layout, pre-defined electrodes, sample waveform, and stimulus sequences. The left panel shows the
layout of the 128 electrodes of the EEG setup. The blue circles highlight the pre-defined fronto-central electrodes. The upper right panel shows a
difference wave containing the MMN. The lower right panel illustrates the structure of the tone sequences presented in the roving oddball
experiment. Tones are shown as black disks whose vertical position indicates sound frequency. The first tone presented after a train of tones of a
different frequency is called a deviant (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.g001
Author Summary
The ability to predict one’s environment is crucial for
adaptive and proactive behaviour. It requires learning a
mental model that captures the environment’s statistical
regularities. A process of this sort is thought to be reflected
by the mismatch negativity (MMN) potential, a non-
invasive electrophysiological measure of the neural
response to regularity violation by sensory stimuli.
However, the exact computational processes reflected by
the MMN remain a matter of debate. We developed a
modelling framework in which competing hypotheses
about these processes can be objectively compared by
their ability to predict single-trial MMN amplitudes. We
applied this framework to formalize five major MMN
theories and propose a unifying view on three distinct
theories which explain the MMN as a reflection of
prediction errors, model adjustment, and novelty detec-
tion, respectively. We assessed our models of the five
theories with EEG data from eight healthy volunteers. Our
results are consistent with the idea that the MMN arises
from prediction error driven adjustments of a probabilistic
mental model of the environment.
Modelling the Mismatch Negativity
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 2 February 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e1002911
The ensuing modelling of single-trial MMN amplitudes and their
progressive changes represents a novel approach, which empha-
sizes the sensory learning on which the MMN rests. Two related
studies using a similar approach recently suggested that single-trial
MMN and P300 amplitudes reflect the trial-wise degree of
Bayesian and Shannon surprise, respectively [23,24]. Here, we
extend this trial-wise approach and formalize the processes
postulated by the five MMN theories introduced above in terms
of specific process models; these are then subjected to Bayesian
model comparison in order to assess how well each of them
explains the variability of trial-wise MMN amplitudes. This
formulation of detailed and quantitative models representing the
5 major contemporary MMN theories constituted the second goal
of this paper. In constructing these models, the third goal was to
show that the prediction error, model adjustment, and novelty
detection theories of the MMN can be unified. Concretely, we
propose that prediction errors, model adjustments and novelty are
different manifestations of a common underlying process, namely
variational free-energy minimization during perceptual inference
and learning [2].
This paper is structured as follows. The Models and Methods
section describes our roving oddball experiment, data acquisition
and pre-processing, the extraction of the single-trial MMN
amplitudes used in the subsequent analysis, as well as our
modelling framework and its application to formalizing each of
five MMN theories by a model family (a set of models with a
shared essence). The two final sections present and discuss the
results obtained by fitting the ensuing models to empirical MMN
responses and applying Bayesian model comparison to assess the
relative plausibility of individual models and MMN theories
(model families).
Models and Methods
Roving paradigm and event related potentials
The empirical data used in this study comprised trial-wise
mismatch responses, acquired during a roving oddball experiment
with electroencephalography (EEG) from eight healthy subjects in
a previously published study [25,26]. Twelve healthy volunteers
(aged 24–34, 4 female) listened passively to a structured sequence
of 1600 pure sine tones adapted from [27]. Subjects sat in front of
a computer screen and were instructed to ignore the tones and
press a button whenever there was a change in the luminance of
the fixation cross. The structure of the stimulus sequences is
illustrated in Figure 1 (lower right panel). For each subject, the
stimulus sequence was structured into approx. 250 trains of a
varying number of identical tones, each of which was followed by a
train of tones with a different frequency. In other words, the same
tone was repeated several times and then changed to a new tone.
This lead to two types of events: tone repetition and tone change.
The probabilities of trains with zero to ten tone repetitions were
2.5%, 2.5%, 3.75%, 3.75%, 12.5%, 12.5%, 12.5%, 12.5%,
12.5%, 12.5%, and 12.5%. The tone frequencies were
500Hz, 550 Hz,    ,750Hz,800Hz, and they occurred with
equal probability in a pseudorandom order. Tones lasted for
70 ms and were presented at a constant stimulus onset asynchrony
of 500 ms for 15 minutes using headphones.
In this study, we quantified the MMN by subtracting the
average of waveforms elicited by the sixth presentation of a tone
(the standard) from the waveform elicited by its first presentation
(the deviant). In other words, we compared responses to physically
identical stimuli presented in different contexts (i.e. after different
stimulus trains). This avoids confounding factors that would have
arisen had we used a classical oddball or mismatch negativity
paradigm [28] for our single-trial analysis (e.g., differences in
physical stimulus properties between standards and deviants and
differences in the degree to which the standard was expected [27]).
Data acquisition and pre-processing. The data were
acquired using a Biosemi EEG setup with 128 electrodes. Data
pre-processing was performed with SPM5. Artefact correction was
performed by thresholding all channels at 80mV. Two subjects
were excluded due to artefacts (as in the original study [25]) and
two further subjects were excluded due to a low signal-to-noise
ratio or undetectable MMN (as in [26]), leaving eight subjects for
the final analysis. We selected a pre-defined set of fronto-central
electrodes based on studies that have differentiated between the
temporal and the frontal MMN subcomponent [29–33] and
analysed the potentials at these electrodes and all electrodes
located between them. Figure 1 (left panel) shows the spatial layout
of these electrodes. Subject-specific subsets of the preselected
electrodes were created by excluding those electrodes where the
expected mismatch potential could not be detected in the subject’s
average difference wave. The detection of MMN was performed
by t-tests comparing the mean potential within the time-window of
the MMN with the mean potentials in two surrounding time
windows (before and after). The critical value of each test was
chosen according to the Sˇida´k correction such that a family-wise
error, i.e. erroneously selecting at least one channel, would occur
with a probability of less than 0:05.
Estimation of single-trial MMN amplitudes. The data
feature that we modelled is the sequence of single-trial MMN
amplitudes that has one element for each deviant trial. Each
deviant trial is characterised by the tone (frequency) and the length
of the preceding train of tone repetitions.
For each subject and each deviant trial the MMN amplitude
was estimated by applying the procedure of Mars et al. [24]
separately to all selected channels. In short, this involved:
1. For each deviant trial, subtract the ‘‘standard ERP’’ of the
presented tone (average response across all trials presenting the
tone for the sixth time in a row) from the EEG signal recorded
in that trial. This isolates the deviance-specific potential.
2. For each deviance-specific potential, subtract the average
potential in the 100 ms preceding the deviant presentation
from the ensuing response (baseline correction).
3. Estimate each subject’s MMN peak latency by the minimum
point of his/her average difference wave (average of deviance-
specific potentials across deviant trials and selected frontal
electrodes) between 100 and 200 ms after stimulus onset [25].
4. Estimate each subject’s trial-wise MMN amplitudes by
averaging his/her deviance-specific potentials over a +70 ms
time window centered at his/her MMN peak latency. The
window’s width (+70 ms) was chosen to match the duration of
the MMN.
A framework for modelling single-trial responses
This section introduces our modelling framework for single-trial
responses. In terms of notation, we denote vectors by lower case
bold letters, matrices by upper case bold letters, and scalars and
functions by lower case italics (except for variables like the free-
energy F for which there are notational conventions in the
literature). Vector and matrix elements can be scalars, vectors, or
matrices, and they are referred to via subscripts (e.g., ut denotes
the tth element of vector u, and Tk,j denotes the j
th element of the
kth row of matrix T).
Models of single-trial responses can be cast in a general dynamic
state-space framework that models the measurements y as
Modelling the Mismatch Negativity
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manifestations of internal states x which cannot be observed
directly. The internal states evolve according to an evolution
function f mapping an internal state and some sensory input u to
the ensuing state. The internal states x generate neurophysiolog-
ical signals in response to sensory input according to a response
function g. These are scaled and combined according to a linear
observation model with regression coefficients b and corrupted by
Gaussian measurement noise e. Both the evolution function and
the response function may depend on parameters h and have the
following general form:
xtz1~f(xt,ut; h)
yt~g(xt,ut; h)bzet, et*N (0,s2e )
ð1Þ
Together with the prior density p(h), the evolution function and
the response function define a generative model of the measure-
ments:
M~ff,g,p(h)g ð2Þ
This framework is based on [34] and enables inferences about
(hidden) computational processes and representations from neuro-
physiological measurements. It is particularly powerful in conjunction
with model comparison methods such as random-effects Bayesian
model selection [35] and model space partitioning (i.e., inference on
model families [36]). Given competing models of learning and
inference, Bayesian model inversion and comparison can be used to
infer the nature of the underlying process and its relationship to the
measured responses. The resulting posterior model probabilities
assess each model’s relative explanatory power in a way that balances
fit and complexity such that the comparison between any two models
is valid irrespective of their relative complexity.
Computational models of the mismatch negativity
We applied the framework introduced in the previous section to
formalize five competing theories of the MMN by formulating
thirteen models (Mi,1ƒiƒ13) of measured trial-wise MMN
amplitudes y elicited by tone sequences u. Each of the five
theories summarized in the introduction (predictive coding,
novelty detection, model adjustment, change detection, and
adaptation) explains the MMN as originating from a particular
process f operating on some neural state or cognitive represen-
tation x. We modelled these processes and representations as well
as the resulting neural responses g(x,u; h) which we interpret as
local field potentials. Since the EEG signal is a linear mixture of
local field potentials, we use a general linear model to map
predicted neuronal activity to MMN amplitude; this is expressed
by Eq. (3) where b are the unknown regression coefficients, and
the trial-wise values of g define the design matrix:
Lt~g(xt,ut; h)
y~Lbze, ei*N 0,s2e
  ð3Þ
Note that this is an equation for a single electrode (we generalize it
to multiple electrodes in Eq. (13)).
The 13 models M1,    ,M13 are derived in detail below. After
formalizing two traditional phenomenological MMN theories (the
change detection hypothesis and the adaptation hypothesis), we
formalize three current theories of the MMN using Bayesian
information processing models based on the free-energy principle.
These models assume that the brain represents probabilistic beliefs
about its environment whose evolution approximates Bayes optimal
learning and perception according to the free-energy principle [37].
The predictive coding, the model adjustment, and the novelty
detection theories were formalized by extending this core assump-
tion by response models g of different neural sub-processes of the
belief updates prescribed by the free-energy principle. Overall, our
model space is structured hierarchically, as shown in Figure 2. First,
our 13 models can be grouped into five model families that
correspond to the five MMN theories introduced above: change
detection (famCD), adaptation (famadaptation), prediction error
(famPE), novelty (famnovelty), and model adjustment
(famadjustment). The models within each family assume the same
internal representation and the same evolution function, but differ
in their response functions. Second, these model families can be
grouped into two super-families: phenomenological models
(fampheno~famCD|famadaptation) and information processing
models (famFEP~famPE|famnovelty|famadjustment). The latter
are formulated within a Meta-Bayesian framework [34] and build
upon the free-energy principle [37]. Table 1 summarizes all
computational models, and the notation used to describe them is
summarized in Table 2.
Change detection hypothesis (Models M1-M3). A classical
interpretation of the MMN is the change detection hypothesis, which
assumes that the MMN indexes local physical changes in the
sensory input [16,17]. This hypothesis comes in several flavours,
each of which leads to different quantitative predictions.
1. The MMN indexes only whether or not a change has occurred.
2. The MMN indexes the absolute value of the change in a
physical property of the sensory input (i.e., unsigned change).
3. The MMN indexes the difference in a physical property
between the deviant and its predecessor (i.e., signed
change).
Here, the relevant physical stimulus property is the log-
frequency of a pure sine tone. In our framework, the general
notion of change detection can be formalized by assuming a one-
dimensional internal representation xt of previous sensory input:
xtz1~f(xt,ut)~ut ð4Þ
This internal representation x and evolution function f are
shared by all three variants of the change detection hypothesis
summarised above. Their divergent interpretations simply rest on
what trial-wise MMN amplitudes depend on; this was expressed
by three different response functions:
M1 : g1(xt,ut)~
1, if ut=xt
0, if ut~xt
(
M2 : g2(xt,ut)~ Dut{xtD 1ð Þ
M3 : g3(xt,ut)~ ut{xt 1ð Þ
ð5Þ
Notably, M1 can be considered a null model, since, in contrast to
all other models in this paper, it postulates that there is no trial-
by-trial variation in MMN amplitude. It predicts the same MMN
amplitude for all modelled trials (and therefore does not include
an additional constant, cf. Eq. (5)). The second and third model
assume that MMN amplitude increases linearly with the change
in log-frequency (cf. [22]), but differ with regard to whether or
not this effect depends on the sign of the difference. Altogether,
these three models constitute the ‘‘change detection’’ family
famCD~fM1,M2,M3g (see Figure 2).
Modelling the Mismatch Negativity
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Adaptation hypothesis (Model M4). Neural adaptation is
the process due to which the neural response to a stimulus or
feature decreases with its repeated or prolonged presentation.
According to the adaptation hypothesis, the MMN elicited by a
change in sound frequency reflects the difference in the
responsiveness of adapted and non-adapted frequency-specific
neurons in auditory cortex [12]. For instance, it has been
suggested that the MMN results from a delay and an attenuation
of the N1 component due to neuronal adaptation [18]. Invasive
recording studies have shown that the firing rate of neurons
selective for the standard frequency decreases monotonically with
the number of standard repetitions [38,39], and that this
adaptation is expressed at multiple time scales: from hundreds of
milliseconds to tens of seconds. These adaptation effects could
result from mechanisms at the level of single neurons and synapses;
e.g. synaptic depression [40] or slow after-hyperpolarizing
potassium currents [41]. Alternative explanations include network
mechanisms such as cascades of depressing synapses [42] or
predictive coding; where adaptation is mediated by local
connections that control the gain of error units [26].
Here, we adopted a phenomenological description of adaptation
that is agnostic to the exact underlying mechanism. We modelled
seven populations of frequency-selective neurons, each of which is
responsive to exactly one of the seven log-frequencies n1,    ,n7
presented in our roving oddball experiment. The internal states are
therefore represented by a seven-dimensional vector
xt~ x1,t . . . x7,tð Þ encoding the current responsiveness of each
neural population to its preferred stimulus frequency. Following
[38], we model the responsiveness of each frequency-specific
population using two exponential processes. Each population’s
responsiveness decays and recovers exponentially with the number
of presentations of its preferred frequency and non-preferred
frequencies, respectively. This is captured by the adaptation model’s
evolution function
xr,tz1~fadapt(xr,t,ut; h)~
xr,t exp({1=tadapt) if vr~ut
1{(1{xr,t) exp({1=trecover) else

ð6Þ
where the free parameters h~ftadapt,trecoverg capture the time scales at
which the adaptation and the recovery process operate and are
allowed to vary across subjects. These parameters were assigned
uniform prior distributions covering the full range of plausible values
reported in [38], i.e. p(tadapt)~p(trecover)~Uniform(½0:1,200).
This model predicts that the MMN amplitude is proportional to
the responsiveness of the stimulus-driven neuronal population.
Therefore, the response function simply reads out the appropriate
state value and combines it with a constant:
M4 : g4(xt,ut)~ xp,t 1ð Þ with p such that vp~ut ð7Þ
In summary, this generative model M4 explains trial-wise MMN
amplitudes in terms of two processes: adaptation and recovery
from adaptation. This model constitutes the ‘‘adaptation’’ model
family famadapt~fM4g of our model space (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Hierarchical structure of the model space: models, theories, and frameworks. The MMN models developed in this article can be
organized into a tree structure. The leaves at the bottom of the tree represent individual models of trial-wise MMN amplitudes, and the nodes above
represent sets of models (model families). The nodes at the third level represent modelling frameworks. Three theories (the prediction error
hypothesis, the novelty detection hypothesis, and model adjustment hypothesis) were formalized under the framework of the free-energy principle
(famFEP). This framework explicitly models information processing, which makes it fundamentally different from phenomenological explanations
(fampheno), such as change detection and adaptation models.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.g002
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Predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty
detection. Predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty detection
are formalized by models based on the free-energy principle
(M5,    ,M13). These models explain the MMN as an electro-
physiological manifestation of the neural mechanisms that
approximate Bayes-optimal perception and learning of sensory
regularities. Figure 3 illustrates that these models are structured
into two components: a Bayesian observer and a response
function. This instantiates our general dynamic state-space
framework: The internal states x represent the Bayesian observer’s
probabilistic beliefs, and the response functions map belief updates
to neural responses. The Bayesian observer is shared by all
information processing models; it is their response functions
g5,    ,g13 (summarized in Table 1) that differentiate them into
models of predictive coding, novelty detection, or model adjust-
ment. As shown in Figure 3, the beliefs of the Bayesian observer
evolve according to an evolution function that depends on the
observer’s mental model. The following two subsections introduce
this mental model and the evolution function respectively, and the
third subsection introduces the response functions. The notation
used to describe the Bayesian observer model is summarized in
Table 2.
The Bayesian observer’s mental model of tone
sequences. We approximate the subjects’ mental model of
tone sequences by an extension of the hidden Markov model; see
Figure 3. This model captures the general principle that the states
of the environment (z) are unobservable and have to be inferred
from sensory inputs (u). Concretely, on each trial of the roving
oddball experiment, the auditory cortex receives sensory input ut
that can be thought of as the sound frequency represented on a
logarithmic scale [43–45] by neural activity in the auditory
thalamus (medial geniculate nucleus, MGN), a key relay station of
the ascending auditory pathway which provides input to the
primary auditory cortex [46].
In our model the hidden environmental state zt[f1,:::,cg
represents the category of the tth tone, e.g. which musical note it
instantiates (note that z is an environmental event and thus a cause
of sensory input; whereas x is an internal state of the brain which
we will assume to encode the sufficient statistics of the approximate
posterior q(z,q); see below). Each tone category has a character-
istic log-frequency vi for i[f1,    ,cgð Þ, but sounds sampled from
it deviate randomly. We assume that the subjects’ initial tone
categories approximately correspond to musical notes, because for
pure tones subjects’ auditory representations are likely to be
shaped by musical experience, and pitch perception becomes
increasingly logarithmic for frequencies above 500 Hz [47]. Since
the tones presented in the experiment range from 500 to 800 Hz,
we simulated categories corresponding to the musical notes from
B4 (493.88 Hz) to Ab5 (830.61 Hz). As a result, the mental model
contains 10 tone categories (c~10), and the learner updates its
estimates of their characteristic frequencies based on sensory input.
While the relationship between the perceived frequency (pitch)
of complex sounds and their physical properties is complicated
[48], the log-frequency of pure sine tones is accurately encoded by
the cochlea [49]. Thus, for pure sine tones the log-frequency
representation of sensory data can be plausibly modelled with:
ut~vztzwt
wt*N (0,s2)
ð8Þ
where vzt is the characteristic log-frequency of the note presented
on trial t and s2 is the variance of the MGN’s representation of
tone’s log-frequency. It corresponds to the observer’s perceptual
uncertainty and was assumed to be constant and known to the
observer.
Furthermore, the temporal structure of the hidden sequence is
represented by the transition matrix T(z1:t; g,a) that captures the
Table 1. This table lists the response models of our 13 computational models of trial-wise MMN amplitudes.
Model Name Estimates generating LFPs Description
M1 : Change Detection 1
g1 :
1, if ut=xt
0, if ut~xt

categorical response: change or no change
M2 : Change Detection 2 g2 : Dut{xt D absolute change in log-frequency
M3 : Change Detection 3 g3 : ut{xt change in log-frequency
M4 : Adaptation 1 g4 : xp,t(ut) with p such that vp~ut response of adapted neurons selective to the deviant
M5 : FEP, Prediction Error 1 g5 : s
{2:(ut{
P
j xv, t(j)
:Txz, t ,j ) precision weighted prediction error (wrt. sensory inputs)
M6 : FEP, Prediction Error 2
g6 :
1{Txz, t ,xz,tz1 (xz,1:t; xg,t,xa,t)
 P
kTxz, t ,k
:(1{Txz, t ,k)
precision weighted prediction error (wrt. tone category)
M7 : FEP, Novelty 1
g7 :
1
2
log(2ps2)z
1
2s2
ut{
X
j
xv,t(j)
:Txz, t ,j
 2 surprise about the sensory input
M8 : FEP, Novelty 2 g8 : {lnTk,i where k~xz,t, i~xz,tz1 surprise about tone category
M9 : FEP, Model adjustment 1 g9 : xv,tz1(xz,tz1){xv,t(xz,tz1) change in the category’s mean frequency
M10 : FEP, Model adjustment 2 g10 : xg,tz1{xg,t change in expected sequence length
M11 : FEP, Model adjustment 3 g11 : xa,tz1 xz,t,xz,tz1ð Þ{xa,t xz,t,xz,tz1ð Þð Þ
if xz,tz1=xz,t,0 else
(absolute value of) change in conditional transition prob.
M12 : FEP, Model adjustment 4 g12 : Dxv,tz1(xz,tz1){xv,t(xz,tz1)D absolute value of change in the category’s mean freq.
M13 : FEP, Model adjustment 5 g13 : Dxg,tz1{xg,t D absolute value of change in expected sequence length
The equations specify the trial-wise predictor variables Li(t,1). The third column explains the hypothesis formalized by each model. The mathematical notation is
explained in Table 2. In both tables the elements of vectors and matrices are sometimes referred to via indices in parentheses such as in xv,t(xz,tz1) which denotes the
element of the vector xv,t whose index is xz,tz1 . For brevity the response functions gi are written in terms of ut , xt , xtz1 , and T. This is consistent with the general state-
space framework (Eq. (1)), because xtz1 and T are fully determined by ut and xt .
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.t001
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distribution of the number of tone repetitions irrespective of tone
identity, and that certain transitions are more likely than others.
The former was achieved by extending the hidden Markov model
[50] such that the transition matrix can depend on the history of
the hidden states; see Section 1 in Text S1 for details. This
extension was motivated by previous MMN studies showing that
the number of standard repetitions is an important factor in
modulating the amplitude of the MMN [27,51–54]. In brief, the
transition matrix depends directly on how often the current tone
has been repeated, as well as on the expected number of tone
repetitions (g) and the conditional probabilities of the next tone
given the current tone and given that a change occurs (a). In
summary, we assume that the mental model m is defined by the
following set of assumptions about the observations u, hidden
states z and parameters q~fv,g,ag:
p(u,z,qDm)~P(z0) p(u0Dz0,q) P
T
t~1
P(ztDz1:t{1,q) p(utDzt,q)
 
p(q; h)
P(z0)~Uniform(f1,    ,cg)
P(ztz1~jDzt~k,z1:t{1,g,a)~Tk,j(z1:t{1,g,a)
p(utDzt; q)~N (vzt ,s2)
q~fv,g,ag, ph(q)
ð9Þ
Here, z1:t denotes the sequence of hidden states from trial 1 to trial
t. The structure of the transition matrix, its dependence on the
history of hidden states, as well as the model parameters and their
priors are described in detail in Section 1 of Text S1. Note that we
Table 2. Explanation of the variables in our computational models of trial-wise MMN amplitudes.
Variable Explanation
Inputs
n1,    ,n7ð Þ~ log(500),    ,log(800)ð Þ log-frequencies (Hz) of tones presented in the roving oddball exp.
ut[fn1,    ,n7g sensory input on trial t
Output
y
(k)
t
MMN amplitude evoked by the tth deviant at the kth electrode
Modelling Framework
M model of trial-wise MMN amplitudes
xt internal state in trial t
fi(xt,ut,h) evolution function mapping the current state and the sensory input to the
next state
gi(xt,ut; h) response function of model Mi , maps internal state and sensory input to
neural response
h subject-specific parameters of the evolution and response functions
Li(x) predictors of local field potentials implied by internal states x and response
function gi
fam model family: set of models with a common characteristic
Internal States of Change Detection Models
xt represents input of current and previous trial (memory trace)
Internal States of Adaption Model
xr,t(ni) responsiveness of neurons selective to log-frequency vi in trial t
Internal States of Bayesian Observer (FEP Models)
M probabilistic mental model of tone sequences
xz,t belief about category of the previous tone
xv,t(j) belief about characteristic log-frequency of the j-th tone category
Tk,l belief about transition probability from hidden state k to hidden state l
xg,t belief about average sequence length
xa,t(k, l) belief about the probability of a transition from category k to category l
given that a change occurs
Parameters (h) of the Change Detection Models
fg This model family has no free parameters.
Parameters (h) of the Adaptation Model
tadapt time constant of the adaptation process
trecover time constant of the recovery from adaptation
Parameters (h) of the Bayesian Observer (FEP Models)
s2 perceptual uncertainty
n0 strength of prior beliefs (number of virtual tone sequences observed prior to
the experiment)
g0 prior expectation of tone sequence lengths
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.t002
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do not make strong assumptions about the prior knowledge each
subject brings to the experiment or their perceptual uncertainty.
Instead, we infer each subject’s prior beliefs ph(q) and perceptual
uncertainty s2[h individually by estimating the hyperparameters h
from their data; for details see Section 3 in Text S1. Importantly,
the hyperparameters are not properties of the environment
learned by the observer, but properties of the observer that must
be inferred by the experimenter [34].
Evolution function of the Bayesian observer’s
beliefs. This subsection derives the evolution function fFEP of
the Bayesian observer’s beliefs from the free-energy principle
(FEP). The free-energy principle goes back to Helmholtz’s idea
that perception is unconscious inference about the state of the
world [55]. More recently this idea has been formalized in terms of
Bayesian inference. The Bayesian brain hypothesis maintains that
the brain computes a probability distribution over the potential
causes (z,q) of its sensory inputs u by inverting a mental model m
of how its sensory inputs are generated [2,3,56–59]. The hidden
causes comprise the hidden environmental states z and a set of
parameters q that describe their effects (i.e., how they influence
each other and how they cause sensory inputs). The normative
solution to this problem is given by Bayes theorem: p(z,qDu,m).
However, evaluating Bayes theorem is intractable for all but the
simplest problems. Thus the brain has to use a more efficient but
potentially less accurate inference mechanism. According to the
free-energy principle, this mechanism optimizes sufficient statistics
of a parametric approximation q(z,q) to the posterior density by
neural dynamics that minimize the free-energy F [2,37,60]. The
free-energy F can be expressed as the surprise (about the joint
occurrence of the sensory inputs u, hidden states z and parameters
q) that is expected under an approximate posterior density q,
minus the entropy of q [61]:
F~G{H
G~S{ ln p(u,t,qDm)Tq
H~S{ ln q z,qð ÞTq
ð10Þ
Figure 3. Structure of free-energy based models of the MMN. Our free-energy models of trial-wise MMN amplitudes (famFEP in Figure 2) are
cast within the general dynamic state-space framework formulated in Equation (1). In contrast to the phenomenological models, the internal states
(x) represent probabilistic beliefs about the environment and evolve according to approximate Bayesian inference by free-energy minimization
(fFEP). All of these models share the Bayesian observer defined by the evolution function fFEP and the probabilistic mental model m, but differ in
their response functions g. The graph in the innermost box shows the mental model m as a probabilistic graphical model (with arrows indicating
conditional dependencies). The random variables in circles are sensory inputs (Ut), tone categories (Zt), and transition probabilities (T). This mental
model determines how subjects perceive, learn about and predict tone sequences. Please see Table 2 for an explanation of the mathematical
notation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.g003
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This free-energy framework, which has been used by several
recent studies examining learning and inference in the brain
[2,61–63], derives from a variational Bayesian [64] perspective on
how optimal Bayesian inference could be approximated efficiently.
In the following, we use this framework for motivating three
families of Bayesian information processing models, in which the
internal states x encode the sufficient statistics of the approximate
posterior q(z,q). For stimuli that are well known and presented at
a very high signal-to-noise ratio, as the sine tones in our case, it is
reasonable to assume that the brain encodes these approximate
posterior beliefs with point estimates. Thus q is a delta-distribution
and its sufficient statistics are its expectations (which are also the
coordinates of its peak), i.e. xt~(xz,t,xq,t) where the first subscript
denotes the variable or parameter, and the second subscript
denotes the trial that the observer entered with this belief. In other
words, xq,t corresponds to prior belief in trial t about the
parameters of the mental model m, and xz,t represents the brain’s
belief (expectation) about the category of the tone presented in trial
t{1. The approximation of posterior beliefs with delta distribu-
tions reduces the free-energy to the expected internal energy G:
F~G~S{ ln p(u,z,qDm)Tq~{ ln p(u,z~xz,q~xqDm) ð11Þ
Minimizing free-energy with respect to the sufficient statistics x of
the approximation q(z,q) accomplishes both perception (inference
on the hidden environmental states z) and learning (inference on
the parameters q). Under the free-energy principle, the temporal
evolution function (Eq. (12)) of the observer’s beliefs follows
directly from the mental model (Eq. (9)) of how sensory inputs are
generated; the result is a deterministic function of the current state
xt and the sensory input ut:
xtz1~fFEP(xt,ut; h)~ argmin
xtz1
F (xtz1,ut,xt,m) ð12Þ
Here, h is a set of three hyperparameters that capture
interindividual differences in the mental model m (see Table 2
and Section 3 in Text S1). The evolution function in Eq. 12 is the
common core of all nine free-energy models of the MMN (models
M5—M13 in Figure 2). It derives from a variational scheme that
relates free-energy minimization to maximum-a-posteriori infer-
ence. It is explained in detail in Section 2 in Text S1, where we
have made an effort to link this scheme to putative neurobiological
mechanisms (Section 6 in Text S1).
To compute the temporal evolution of the internal states
predicted by our free-energy models, the evolution function was
iteratively applied to the known sequence of log-frequencies
presented in the empirical study. This provides a succession of
posterior beliefs that are encoded by neuronal activity and give rise
to trial-wise MMN responses. To specify this mapping between
posterior beliefs and MMN amplitudes, we now turn to the
response models (g5,    ,g13).
Response functions: From posterior beliefs to the MMN
amplitudes. After the preceding sections have described the
Bayesian observer, this section describes the response functions
specifying how its internal states manifest in measured MMN
amplitudes. In the present MMN literature, there are three major
hypotheses which can be understood as special cases of the free-
energy framework in Figure 3. These hypotheses differ in which
particular aspect of sensory learning and perception they postulate
to be reflected by the MMN. In our framework, these competing
views can be expressed by three classes of response models g
linking the MMN to different neural sub-computations of the
belief updates prescribed by the free-energy principle. These
response models are briefly summarized here; technical details can
be found in Tables 1 and 2, as well as in Section 4 in Text S1.
1. The prediction error models assume that the MMN
reflects the activity of neurons encoding precision weighted
prediction errors on sensory inputs and hidden states. Roughly
speaking, prediction errors are the difference between what is
observed and what was predicted from previous experience
according to the probabilistic mental model m. These models
appeal to predictive coding [5] formulations of free energy
minimization that rest upon hierarchical message passing
between representational and prediction error units . Notably,
the MMN may be sensitive to prediction errors on sensory
inputs, or to prediction errors on hidden states. Each possibility
is formalized by a response model (famPE~fM5,M6g; see
Table 1).
2. The novelty detection models assume that the MMN
reflects neuronal activity encoding surprisal (also known as
‘‘self-information’’ or ‘‘Shannon surprise’’) with respect to the
conditional probability distributions describing the observer’s
beliefs. Unlike prediction error, surprisal is an unsigned
quantity, corresponding to the negative logarithm of the
conditional probability of sensory inputs given expectations
about hidden states (or of hidden states given expectations
about model parameters). Because the mental model assumes
additive Gaussian noise, the conditional surprise about a
stimulus is determined by the precision weighted squared
prediction error on the stimulus (equivalently for hidden states).
This provides a tractable approximation to the Shannon
surprise with respect to the prior predictive density over
sensory inputs ({ ln p(yDm)) – which, critically, is a formal
measure of novelty. This class of response models is thus
compatible with hypotheses according to which the MMN
indexes an automatic novelty detection process [21,22]. While the
first novelty detection model links the MMN to the novelty of
sensory inputs, the second novelty detection model links the
MMN to the novelty of hidden temporal structure
(famnovelty~fM7,M8g; see Table 1).
3. The ‘‘model adjustment’’ models assume that trial-wise
MMN amplitudes reflect adjustments of the parameters of the
probabilistic mental model m; this is a formalization of the
model adjustment hypothesis [19]. MMN amplitudes could reflect
adjustments of different parameters (i.e., the categories’ mean
frequencies, the expected sequence length, and the conditional
transition probabilities) and in different ways (i.e., sensitive or
insensitive to the sign of the adjustment). This implies a
factorial structure of 3|2~6 response models. Section 4 in
Text S1 provides details and explains why two of these models
are redundant, thus resulting in 5 response models for this
family (famadj~fM9,    ,M13g; see Table 1).
This completes the formulation of 13 computational models of
trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude distributed over five
model families (see Figure 2). We now proceed to describing
family-level Bayesian model selection [36] for evaluating the
relative plausibility of the five hypotheses (model families).
Importantly, this model comparison at the family levels is less
dependent on details of the individual models and thus integrates
out uncertainty about how each hypothesis should be formalized
exactly.
Bayesian model selection
Above, we have derived 13 different models predicting the trial-
wise MMN amplitudes during our roving oddball experiment.
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These models differ in numerous ways, conceptually and
mathematically. For example, the evolution function of the change
detection models has no free parameters whereas the evolution
function of free-energy models has 3 free parameters (see Table 2).
Critically, because model fit increases monotonically with model
complexity, the relative plausibility of these models cannot simply
be established based on how well they fit the data. Generally, the
true desideratum of model comparison, the generalizability of a
model, cannot be determined from fit measures alone; instead,
model comparison needs to assess the trade-off between model fit
and model complexity [65,66]. From a Bayesian perspective, this
is provided by the (log) model evidence (i.e., the log probability of
the data given a model) which corresponds to the negative surprise
about the data and represents a principled measure of the balance
between model fit and model complexity. Here, we used a
Bayesian model selection (BMS) procedure at the group level that
treats models as random effects in the population and can
successfully deal with population heterogeneity and outliers [35].
As input, this procedure requires the log-evidence of each model
considered, for each subject separately. In the following, we
describe how these log-evidences were obtained, detailing the
likelihood function and priors that underlie the computation of the
log-evidence for individual models and subjects.
As EEG signals result from a linear superposition of local
electrophysiological responses, one can use a general linear model
to map the predictions of local field potentials (Li in Table 2) to
measured trial-wise MMN amplitudes. In each subject and for
each model considered, we modelled the data matrix of trial-wise
MMN amplitudes across all trials 1,    ,tð Þ and across all selected
electrodes 1,    ,kð Þ as follows:
Let y(k)~ y
(k)
1 . . . y
(k)
t
 T
denote the vector of MMN
amplitudes at a selected electrode k. We regard each y(k) as noisy
observations of an electrode-specific linear mixture of evoked
neuronal responses that reflect the trial-by-trial evolution of
internal states. For each response model Mi described above, we
therefore apply the following multivariate Bayesian linear regres-
sion model with conjugate priors to each subject’s data:
Y~ y(1)    y(k) ~Xi b(1)    b(k) z e(1)    e(k) 
ei*N 0,Se,ið Þ with Se,i~
s2e,i    0
..
. P ...
0    s2e,i
0
BBB@
1
CCCA for 1ƒiƒk
ð13Þ
Here, Xi denotes the design matrix that was created by replacing
the non-constant columns of Li (cf. Eq. 3) by their z-transforms,
b(k) are the regression coefficients for the kth electrode, and se,k is
the standard deviation of measurement errors at the kth electrode.
When inverting this model, we used uninformative Gaussian priors
on the regression coefficients and uninformative Gamma priors on
the error precisions; for details see Section 5 in Text S1.
Note that we are not interested in the regression coefficients but
in each model’s log-evidence log p(yDmi). Given the likelihood
function and priors described above, the log-model evidences were
computed by Monte-Carlo integration (see Section 5 in Text S1
for details). Based on the log model-evidences, we estimated the
posterior probability of each model by a Bayesian random effects
analysis at the group level [35] with a uniform prior on models.
For comparing the model families described in Figure 2 Bayesian
inference on partitions of model-space [36] was performed to
compute the posterior probability P(fami DY) of each model family,
where Y denotes the data across all pre-defined electrodes and
subjects. This approach can easily deal with families of different
size (i.e., different numbers of models per family). In brief,
unbiased family-level inference requires uniform (flat) priors over
families, and this was achieved by setting each model’s ‘‘prior
count‘‘ (i.e. the parameters of the Dirichlet prior on model
probabilities) to 1 over the size of the respective model family; see
[36] for details. Inference on model families used Gibbs sampling
with two million samples per family. Finally, we computed the
exceedance probability [35] for each model and model family, i.e.,
the probability that this model (family) was more likely to have
generated the data than any other model (family).
Results
Models and theories of the MMN
In the Models and Methods section, we derived five classes of
models describing how the MMN may reflect the computational
processes that govern learning and perception during the roving
oddball experiment. Three of the five model classes were derived
from the free-energy principle and correspond to formal repre-
sentations of three contemporary theories of the MMN; i.e.,
predictive coding, novelty detection, and model adjustment. These
models explain the MMN as arising from prediction error signals,
surprise or adjustments to model parameters, respectively.
Furthermore, we formalized two traditional theories of the
MMN: the change detection and adaptation theory. The resulting
model space comprised 13 models in five families (see Figure 2). In
all models, we have connected the (hidden) processes of perception
and learning to measured EEG responses via different response
models and a linear electromagnetic forward model. In this
section, we assess the relative plausibility of these models and
model families using posterior model probabilities and exceedance
probabilities computed by Bayesian model selection (BMS) as
detailed above. The resulting posterior distributions will be
presented as figures, and the main text will report inferences
based on those distributions in terms of exceedance probabilities.
Figure 4 shows the results of BMS in terms of the posterior
probabilities of all models considered. First, note that our ‘‘null’’
model (M1, the first change detection model), the only model
predicting the absence of trial-by-trial changes in MMN ampli-
tudes, is not the best model. Contrary to the predictions of this
model, the MMN amplitude appears to vary systematically over
deviant trials. This suggests that the MMN is not simply a
categorical response to regularity violation but context dependent,
as predicted by trial-by-trial statistical learning. Notably, the best
five models were all derived within the free-energy framework.
Model M6, which explains trial-wise changes in MMN amplitude
as a manifestation of precision weighted prediction errors (on the
hidden tone category), was best supported by our data (exceedance
probability w~0:21). It was followed by three ‘‘model adjustment’’
models (M10, M11, M13), each with exceedance probability
ww0:15. These models explain fluctuations in MMN amplitude
as arising from a trial-wise adjustment of the parameters encoding
posterior beliefs about the expected number of tone repetitions
and the conditional transition probabilities. When examining the
fit of the best model, we found that it accounted for 2.3% of the
total variance of single-trial MMN amplitudes (across all subjects).
The amount of variance explained was significant in each and
every subject (p,0.01 in 6 subjects; p,0.02 in two subjects). To
put this into perspective, this model-based explanation accounted
for about 6.5 times as much variance as could be explained by a
more conventional analysis, i.e., a linear regression model
considering recent stimulus history (number of standards preced-
ing the deviant).
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While the exceedance probability of the best model M6 was
about five times as large as the exceedance probability of our
‘‘null’’ model M1, this was too small to yield an acceptably low
probability of model selection error [67]. As the bar plot shows,
the probability mass is concentrated on two model families
(prediction error and model adjustment) but distributed over
several models. Thus, BMS at the level of model families was more
appropriate than comparing individual models. From a statistical
perspective, this trades a reduced resolution of the hypothesis
(model) space for increased statistical power. In other words, we
move from asking which specific model is best to asking which of
the five general MMN theories best explains the data, irrespective
of their precise implementations (cf. Figure 2). This comparison of
the five model families is summarized in Figure 5a. The most
plausible MMN theory was the model adjustment theory
(w~0:70), followed by the prediction error theory (w~0:24).
Finally, we used BMS to examine whether the free-energy
principle based models provide, in general, better explanations of
the variability of single-trial MMN amplitudes than phenomeno-
logical models. This means we are now comparing only two
families (Figure 2): the family of free-energy based models
(predictive coding, novelty detection and model adjustment;
famFEP~fM5,    ,M13g) and the family of more traditional
phenomenological models (change detection and adaptation,
fampheno~fM1,    ,M4g). Family-level BMS indicated that
models based on the free-energy principle were considerably
more convincing than phenomenological models; w~0:99 (see
Figure 5b).
Level of representation
Finally, we asked which level of the processing hierarchy
contributes most to the fluctuations in trial-wise MMN amplitudes.
In other words, we examined whether response variations arise from
lower auditory areas representing physical sound properties like
frequency, or from higher areas that represent abstract temporal
structure. For this purpose we re-partitioned the 13 models into two
families according to whether they explain MMN generation in
relation to a low-level auditory feature (sound frequency) or a high-
level auditory feature (temporal structure). For the models based on
the free-energy principle models the two levels of representation
map onto the two levels of the mental model: sensory inputs and
hidden sequence of tone categories (Figure 3). We assigned the free-
Figure 4. Posterior probabilities of the 13 MMN models. The 13 MMN models were compared by their posterior probability given the trial-
wise MMN amplitudes of all eight subjects. These posterior probabilities were computed by random effects Bayesian model selection at the group
level. The bars are coloured according to the theory instantiated by each model. The model explaining trial-wise MMN amplitudes by precision
weighted prediction errors on the unobservable tone category (M6) had the highest posterior probability (P(M6DY)~0:13). It is closely followed by
three almost equally probable ‘‘model adjustment’’ models (P(M10DY),P(M11DY),P(M13DY)&0:12), and the model explaining trial-wise MMN
amplitudes by prediction errors on the observed log-frequency (P(M5DY)~0:09).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.g004
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energy based models that relate the MMN elicited by changes in
sound frequency to the representation of sound frequencies to the
first model family and those that relate it to the represented
sequence of tone categories to the second. Furthermore, both the
adaptation model and the change detection theory are formulated
explicitly with regard to stimulus frequencies and are therefore
assigned to the first model family. Overall, this resulted in the
following two model families: famlow~fM1,    ,M5,M7,M9,M12g
and famhigh~fM6,M8,M10,M11,M13g. Comparing these two
model families yielded an exceedance probability of whigh~0:97
for famhigh, suggesting that the auditory MMN is more closely
related to a representation of high-level auditory features, such as
temporal structure, than to a representation of low-level features,
such as sound frequency.
Single-trial MMN amplitudes are history-dependent
The models reported above were designed to predict the
evolution of single-trial MMN amplitudes throughout the exper-
iment. This was done to capture putative history-dependent
effects. The models which did take into account such effects (i.e.,
free energy based models) were found to have higher evidence
than models which did not (e.g., the various change detection
models). One may ask, however, as did one of our reviewers,
whether our single-trial approach was really necessary or whether
Figure 5. Bayesian model comparison of the five MMN theories (a) and the two frameworks (b). The bar plot in the upper panel (a)
summarizes the comparison of the five model families in terms of their posterior probabilities. Each bar indicates the posterior probability of a
particular MMN theory (i.e. P(famCDDY),    ,P(famadjustmentDY)). The most plausible explanations of our trial-wise MMN data were provided by the
model adjustment hypothesis (P(famadjustmentDY)&0:44) and the prediction error hypothesis (P(famPEDY)&0:28). The lower panel (b) shows the
results of comparing phenomenological (fampheno) vs. free-energy based models (famFEP); see Figure 2. It shows that our free-energy based models
provide considerably more convincing explanations of our MMN data than traditional change detection or adaptation models (P(famFEPDY)~0:87).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.g005
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it would have been sufficient to analyse the average MMN
amplitude as a function of the number of preceding standards
and the change in frequency. Here we provide a conventional
analysis of variance to demonstrate that our data did contain
history-dependent effects that would have been removed by
conventional averaging. By history-dependent effects we mean
that the MMN amplitude evoked by a deviant following a given
number of standards and a given frequency change will differ
depending on the tones that preceded the current sequence of
standards. The mere number of such tones is a minimal definition that
ignores the effects of their statistical structure, some of which are
captured by our models. However, it allows for a conservative test of
history-dependence, i.e., whether a 3-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) of trial-wise MMN amplitudes reveals interactions among
three factors: (i) number of preceding standards, (ii) frequency
difference, and (ii) time, i.e., the number of preceding trial sequences.
We found significant main effects for the number of preceding
standards and for frequency difference (Figure 6). More importantly,
however, we found highly significant interaction effects, indicating that
the effect of the number of preceding standards on MMN amplitude
did not only depend on the frequency difference between standard and
deviant (F 10,24681ð Þ~28:65, pv10{15) but also on the number of
previous tone sequences (F (10,24681)~12:42, pv10{15). This
demonstrates that the trial-wise MMN amplitudes we recorded do
indeed show history-dependent effects that would be removed by
conventional averaging procedures.
Discussion
In this paper we presented a framework for modelling single-trial
responses, applied it to formalize five major theories of the MMN (see
Figure 2), and tested them quantitatively against trial-wise MMN
amplitudes measured with EEG from eight healthy volunteers. Our
main finding was that models linking the MMN to computations
approximating Bayes-optimal sensory learning and perception (see
Figure 3) provide better predictions of single-trial MMN amplitudes
than two classical theories (see Figure 5). Furthermore, this paper
offered a unifying perspective on three current theories of the MMN:
prediction errors, model adjustment, and novelty can all be seen as
manifestations of approximate Bayesian learning of sensory regular-
ities by free-energy minimization.
Single-trial MMN amplitudes are informative about
statistical learning
Our analyses suggested that stimulus history (i.e., previous tone
sequences) affects the MMN in intricate ways. This was not only
demonstrated by a simple ANOVA of single-trial MMN
amplitudes, but, more importantly, by our systematic model
comparisons which favoured free-energy based Bayesian informa-
tion processing models that capture history-dependent effects. In
particular, these models explain the dependence of the MMN on
interactions between previous tone sequences and the current tone
sequence in terms of trial-by-trial learning of statistical structure.
Trial-by-trial statistical learning implies that the probabilistic
expectation evoked by a given tone sequence is different for every
presentation, and that each difference reflects what has been
learned since the previous presentation. While traditional MMN
studies have ignored trial-specific effects by averaging responses
across deviant events, several studies have addressed sequential
changes in the MMN across trials [19,23,25–27,51–54,68–70].
However, only [23] and [68] have completely avoided averaging
procedures altogether. The results of this study and [23] question
the frequent assumption that the MMN amplitude is constant
throughout an experimental condition (i.e., for given tones and
following a given number of standards). Instead, our results suggest
that trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude are highly history-
dependent and represent an informative index of statistical
learning as the recording session proceeds. It is pleasing that
[23] reached a similar conclusion, even though they studied
mismatch potentials in a different modality (i.e., somatosensory)
and with simpler models, but with source-reconstruction and a
high temporal resolution. Thus, while averaging is a useful tool to
increase the signal-to-noise ratio, single-trial data carry unique
information about the processes of learning and perception that
underlie the MMN.
Figure 6. Trends in MMN amplitudes. Figure 6a shows the average MMN amplitude as a function of the number of standards preceding the
deviant. Figure 6b shows the average MMN amplitude as a function of the frequency of the deviant minus the frequency of the preceding standard
(frequency change).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002911.g006
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MMN amplitude as a function of the number of
preceding standards
A number of previous studies reported that the MMN
amplitude elicited by a change in sound frequency increases
monotonically with the number of preceding standards [27,51–
54,69,70]. By contrast, we found a non-monotonic effect of the
number of preceding standards on deviant response amplitude (see
Figure 6a). The reason for this discrepancy may be that previous
studies did not disentangle the contributions of the standard ERP
and the deviant ERP (cf. [71]). In contrast, in this study, we
operationalized the MMN with respect to a fixed standard ERP
(see Models and Methods), so that changes in MMN amplitude
reflected changes in the neural response to the deviant only. In
summary, our results do not contradict previous findings on the
relationship between the number of preceding standards and the
MMN amplitude [27,51–54,69,70] but complement them. Fur-
thermore, our models based on the free-energy principle can
explain why Haenschel et al. [27] observed a monotonic decay of
the standard response with the number of standard repetitions,
and they predict how stimulus history determines the effect of
preceding standards on deviant response amplitude.
Implications for theories of the MMN
Our modelling results do not lend support to the adaptation
hypothesis of the MMN [18] or the change detection interpretation
of the memory trace hypothesis [72]. Instead, our results support
explanations postulating that the brain maintains and constantly
updates an internal model of its environment. For example, the
model adjustment hypothesis [19] posits that auditory cortex maintains
a model of the acoustic environment, and that stimulus-induced
updates of this model are indexed by the MMN [20]. While the
original proposal was of a conceptual nature, our present work
formalizes this hypothesis by specifying how trial-wise changes in
MMN reflect an approximation to Bayesian updating of a
probabilistic mental model. The resulting models are consistent
with the conclusion drawn by [23] that (somatosensory) mismatch
potentials reflect perceptual learning. However, our analysis was
more fine-grained in that it distinguished between three computa-
tional mechanisms that might underlie the perceptual learning that
[23] indexed in terms of Bayesian surprise. Concretely, we
distinguished between prediction error signalling, novelty detection,
and model adjustment. Our results supported model adjustment
and, to a lesser extent, prediction error signalling, but not novelty
detection, even though it computes an approximation to (Shannon)
surprise. We also distinguished between perceptual learning at the
level of physical stimulus properties (sound frequency) and learning
of abstract temporal structure and found strong evidence for the
latter. In neurobiological terms, model adjustment might corre-
spond to synaptic plasticity at top-down projections targeting
pyramidal neurons in layers 2 and 3 (‘‘prediction error units’’) via
NMDA receptors [3] (see Section 6 in Text S1). This would be
consistent with the observation that pharmacological blockage of
NMDA receptors diminishes the MMN [73–75].
Predictive coding formulations of free-energy minimization
assign prediction errors a critical role in the update of posterior
beliefs. When comparing all models individually, the best model
was indeed one that explained trial-wise fluctuations in MMN
amplitude as a function of precision weighted prediction errors
(model M6; Figure 4). However, its superiority over other models
was marginal, and model comparison at the family-level (Figure 5a)
did not support the hypothesis (proposed in [3]) that the MMN
solely reflects precision weighted prediction errors. This suggests
that while prediction error signalling may be essential for the free-
energy minimization process underlying the MMN, it is probably
not the sole determinant of trial-wise MMN amplitudes. Alterna-
tively, our failure to find stronger evidence for the hypothesis that
(precision weighted) prediction errors alone determine trial-wise
MMN amplitudes may be due to some of our simplifying
assumptions, as discussed in the next section.
Limitations
Overall, one should bear in mind that our inferences are
primarily about rather abstract models or classes of models. Our
free-energy based models, in particular, consider the outcomes of
neuronal computations rather than their process. This is a
necessary constraint on models of discrete trial-by-trial variations
in responses; as opposed to continuous time models that would
consider the precise time-course of neural responses over
peristimulus time. This means that we have to assume that there
is some aspect of neuronal activity or excitability that encodes the
posterior beliefs associated with each oddball trial. However, the
relationship between biophysical quantities like synaptic activity or
gain, on the one hand, and posterior beliefs, predictions, and
surprisal, on the other hand, are not specified explicitly in this sort
of model. This means that it is difficult to make any strong
statements about the neurobiology that implements any Bayesian
inference.
Furthermore, our models make several simplifying assumptions
that may turn out to be false. First, there is still no conclusive
evidence about how prediction errors are represented at the level
of single neurons. Second, the assumption of a linear relationship
between the encoded quantity and the MMN amplitude is
simplistic and ignores potential nonlinearities. Third, all of our
models represent the MMN by a single number (i.e., its peak
amplitude), rather than by its waveform, thereby ignoring its
temporal dynamics and spatial topography. Fourth, each of our
models relates trial-wise MMN amplitudes to a single computa-
tional variable, whereas it is known that the MMN scalp potential
is a mixture of signals from several brain areas with (presumably)
different functional characteristics [29–31,76]. Finally, while our
results indicated that our neuronal adaptation model M4 is
insufficient to explain single-trial variations in MMN, we have not
tested the fresh-afferent theory [13] that is based on stimulus
specific adaptation. In future work, it would be useful to formulate
this theory as models of stimulus specific adaptation [12,13,42]
under the present framework and compare it to the computational
models presented in this paper.
Relation to the Bayesian-brain hypothesis
Our models based on the free-energy principle link the MMN to
the neuronal encoding of posterior beliefs that is postulated by the
Bayesian brain hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the brain
represents probabilistic beliefs, and updates them in an (approx-
imately) Bayesian fashion. Previous work along these lines has
assumed that the support of probability distributions is partitioned
into small bins and that each bin’s probability mass is represented
by the firing rate of dedicated neurons [77,78], or that probability
densities are approximated by a linear combination of basis
functions [79]. In contrast to these high-dimensional representa-
tions, we have implicitly assumed a much simpler, low dimensional
fixed-form approximation to the posterior density. Our predictors
of electrophysiological responses are simple functions of posterior
expectations on log-frequency, tone category and transition
probabilities. These posterior expectations might be encoded by
the average activities of neuronal populations, and the precision
parameters that determine the relative weight assigned to prior
beliefs and sensory evidence could be encoded by the strength of
the recurrent connections of prediction error units [80] (see also
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Section 6 in Text S1). This representation is not motivated by
sparseness, but by computational efficiency: It replaces the
problem of computing the (potentially very high-dimensional)
posterior probability density by optimizing the free-energy with
respect to a small set of sufficient statistics. This variational
Bayesian optimization rests on free-energy minimization [37] and
proposes the minimization of prediction error as an explanation
for stimulus-evoked transient neuronal responses such as the
MMN [3,63,81]. The work presented in this paper is a step
towards linking models of probabilistic neural coding and
inference to neuronal signals that can be measured non-invasively
in humans.
Potential future directions
Our present results were based on a single ‘‘roving oddball’’
EEG experiment that was originally designed for comparing
dynamic causal models of interactions among cortical areas during
the MMN [25]. In the future, it would be interesting to apply the
approach presented here to other types of MMN paradigms.
Additionally, one could use our models in conjunction with recent
advances in design optimization that maximize the sensitivity of
Bayesian model selection [67] to create an experiment that is
optimal for discerning between the models selected by our
analysis. In addition, our modelling and model comparison
framework could be applied to source-reconstructed mismatch
potentials to characterize functional differences between the brain
areas jointly generating MMN scalp potentials.
Furthermore, the link between single-trial mismatch potentials,
on the one hand, and statistical learning and perceptual inference,
on the other hand, could be exploited to measure the temporal
dynamics of how the brain learns the probabilistic structure of
complex environments. This is an attractive prospect, given that
the MMN is elicited not only in simple oddball experiments, but
also in more complex experiments involving speech, language,
music, and abstract features, as well as various other sensory
modalities [14,71,82,83]. Our modelling framework could also be
used to probe disturbances of perceptual inference and learning in
psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia [84–86]. In addition,
future studies might use the meta-Bayesian approach [34] for
inferring, from single-trial MMN amplitudes, subjects’ prior beliefs
about hidden temporal structure, which constitute the inductive
biases [87] that endow the brain with its remarkable ability to
discover complex sequential regularities.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Mathematical details of our models and
methods. Sections 1—4 provide additional information about
the models based on the free-energy principle. Concretely, these
sections specify how we modelled the brain’s internal model of
tone sequences, learning and perception, individual differences,
and the manifestation of neurocomputational variables in scalp
potentials. Section 5 explains how we approximated each model’s
log-evidence. Section 6 sketches how the computations postulated
by the free-energy models could be implemented in the brain.
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